We extend the U.S. bank M&As literature by examining announcement returns for acquisitions of both listed and unlisted targets by U.S. banking firms for a long period of time from the eighties till to date. Over these decades there have been implemented several regulation changes, notably the Dodd-Frank Act that would be of interest to examine whether they have any impact, and if indeed they have to which direction, on value creation in M&As in the U.S. banking industry. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that bidding banks lose upon the announcement of a merger, we find positive abnormal returns for these firms that choose to acquire privately-held targets. Further, returns for acquirers in private offers do not depend on the method of payment, legislative changes, size, or geographical scope. However, we find that the use of a financial advisor on the part of the bidder can better explain the variation in abnormal returns for such offers. Our results are not influenced by any unobserved bidder-specific component or sample selection issues.
Introduction
The U.S. banking industry has experienced intense consolidation in the previous decades. Financial innovation and deregulation fostered successive bank merger waves.
However, empirical research fails to provide conclusive evidence that the U.S. bank mergers create value for the bidding firms' shareholders. In fact, Cornett and De (1991) , Houston and Ryngaert (1994) , DeLong (2001) , DeLong and DeYoung (2007) , Brewer and Jagtianni (2013), among others, document marginally negative or insignificant market reaction for bidding firms at the merger announcement date. These findings contradict the consensus view, that mergers and acquisitions (M&As) occur for synergies. Notably, all of these studies examine M&As between listed firms, despite the fact that the majority of acquisitions by U.S banks involves unlisted targets.
Motivated by the lack of empirical evidence for bank acquisitions of nonpublic firms, we attempt to shed light on this unexamined issue and investigate whether banks could gain if they choose to acquire unlisted targets. Therefore, we use a large and comprehensive sample of 2,178 M&As of public, privately-held, and subsidiary targets by U.S. banks announced over the period 1984 to 2015. Our initial findings indicate the existence of a "listing effect" in our sample, which is consistent with prior literature on non-financial M&As (Chang, 1998; Fuller et al, 2002; Officer et al., 2009; Netter et al., 2011; Arikan and Stulz, 2016; Brander and Egan, 2017) : bidders acquiring listed targets achieve negative announcement abnormal returns whereas bidders acquiring standalone private companies earn significant abnormal returns upon the merger announcement.
Importantly, when we examined the sources of this difference in market reaction between listed and unlisted bids, we find results that deviate from the empirical findings in non-financial M&As. Contrary to Chang (1998) , Fuller et al. (2002) , Officer et al. reputation on bidder returns, and we find a negative or at best insignificant relationship between the use top-tier advisors and announcement period returns for all types of mergers (McLaughlin, 1992; Hunter and Jagtianni, 2003; Ismail 2010; Graham et al., 2015) .
We also consider the possibility that there could be a bidder-specific driver of acquisition success that can better explain the variation of abnormal returns across the several types of M&As (Golubov et al., 2015) . We find that even after the inclusion of bidder fixed effects in our regression analyses, banks that acquire private firms and employ financial advisors enjoy the highest possible abnormal returns. Further, we also control for the possibility that the choice of the target firm is endogenously determined.
In order to address this issue, we employ the two-stage procedure outlined by Heckman (1979), and we find that all our results continue to hold after controlling for potential endogenous sample selection.
Our study is related to the extensive literature on the listing effect on non-financial U.S. mergers (Chang, 1998; Fuller et al., 2002; Officer, 2009; Netter et al., 2011, Arikan and Stulz, 2016) . We apply a similar process in a different context-M&As by U.S. banking firms-and find, a significant difference in market reaction between public and nonpublic bids. Further, our study is also related to the literature on the interaction between bidder financial advisors and announcement period gains (Servaes and Zenner, 1996; Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003; Golubov et al., 2012; Graham et al., 2015) . Our empirical results indicate that bidding banks could realize positive abnormal returns as long as they acquire privately-held firms, and use financial advisory to resolve potential uncertainties regarding the target firm's valuation. These findings contradict the consensus view that banks lose upon the announcement of a merger (Houston and Ryngaert, 1994; DeLong, 2003; Gupta and Misra, 2007, Brewer and Jagtiani, 2013) .
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to examine bank acquisitions under this perspective.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and develops the implications of the prior empirical findings in our study.
Section 3 details the data collection for the empirical analysis. Sections 4 and 5 present the univariate and multivariate empirical analysis, respectively. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Related background and research questions
There is a plethora of studies examining the relation between bidder returns and the target firm's listing status in non-financial U.S. M&As. Chang (1998), Fuller et al., (2002) , Moeller et al. (2004) , Officer et al. (2009) all find positive abnormal returns for acquirers of private firms and subsidiaries. The authors also document a positive relation between bidder returns and equity financing in such deals.
There are several explanations for the larger returns to acquiring firms when the target is unlisted. Chang (1998) suggests that equity offers for private firms tend to create outside blockholders that could serve as effecting monitors of managerial performance.
Fuller et al. (2002) document similar results and illustrate tax considerations benefits
as an alternative explanation for the higher abnormal returns for stock offers relative to cash offers for private targets. Moeller et al. (2004) outline the importance of the acquiring firm's size in explaining the difference in market reaction between listed and unlisted targets. Acquirers of private targets are more likely to be smaller and pay less for acquisitions than acquirers of public targets. Officer et al. (2009) find a significant positive relation between announcement period returns and stock financing in difficult-to-value targets, since stock financing is considered to mitigate information asymmetry about the uncertain value of the target firm. In fact, the effect of target-valuation uncertainty is more evident to acquisitions of nonpublic firms, since private firms are more opaque in comparison to publicity traded companies.
Recent empirical work in M&As also documents a significant difference in market reaction between listed and unlisted targets. John et al. (2010) highlight the importance of the target country's investor protection in determining the magnitude of the listing effect on bidder gains. By using a large sample of cross-border acquisitions of public and private firms by U.S. bidders, the authors find that in high investor protection target countries bidder abnormal returns are significantly negative for public targets and significantly positive for private targets. Netter et al. (2011) utilize a large sample of non-financial U.S. acquisitions of both public and private firms, and find comparable results with previous studies: in stock offers, bidders realize the lowest returns when the target is publicly-traded and the highest when the target is a private firm. Arikan and Stulz (2016), show that acquiring firms have better growth opportunities and realize higher announcement returns in acquisitions of nonpublic firms. Brander and Egan (2017) examine acquisition of both public and private firms under the winner's curse perspective. Their findings indicate a stronger winner's curse in public offers, since the proportion of acquiring firms realizing negative announcement returns is substantially higher in such deals.
It has been documented in the literature that uncertainty in non-financial M&As constitutes a key element in explaining bidder abnormal returns (Hansen, 1987; Moeller et al., 2007; Officer et al., 2009) . In fact, acquirers of more opaque targets experience a larger fraction of total acquisition gains, since they are able to obtain superior information regarding the target firm's value during the due diligence process (Luypaert and Van Caneghem, 2017) . It is therefore likely, that the use of a financial advisor may help the acquiring firm to gather such information and identify potential synergetic opportunities. In fact, one important aspect of the financial advisory services is to ascertain the informationally opaque target value to the acquiring firm. Servaes and Zenner (1996) found that financial advisors are used in more complex transactions that are characterized by significant asymmetric information.
There is a growing literature that examines the relation between financial advisory services and bidder abnormal returns. Bowers and Miller (1990) found that the choice of a financial advisor constitutes an important determinant of merger gains for acquiring firms. In their more recent studies, Ismail (2010) and Graham et al. (2015) suggest that acquiring firms garner higher abnormal returns when they employ non-top-tier financial advisors, rather than large prestigious investment banks. On the other hand, Golubov et al. (2012) document a positive relationship between advisor reputation and bidder CARs, after controlling for selection bias issues.
All the aforementioned studies focus exclusively on non-financial M&As. Therefore, it would be interesting to investigate whether such findings have any application in acquisitions by U.S. banks. In our study, we examine whether banking firms could realize positive abnormal returns by acquiring unlisted firms. In addition, we identify if there is any relation between the use of a financial advisor by the acquiring firm and announcement period gains. It is commonly held that financial firms are inherently more opaque than non-financial firms (Wagner, 2007; Kwan and Carleton, 2010) . If we assume that information gathering is indeed meaningful to acquiring firms, then it is reasonable to expect that the use of a financial advisor would translate to higher bidder abnormal returns, especially in cases where information regarding the target is not widely available.
Sample and data
We collect merger data from Thomson ONE database. Our sample consists of all successful M&As by U.S. banking firms, with initial bids announced between January 1, 1984 and December 31, 2015.
1 We retrieve mergers that meet the following criteria:
1. Bidding firms are commercial banks with a three-digit primary SIC code equal to 602, or bank holding companies with a four-digit primary SIC code equal to 6712.
2. The bidder is publicly-traded. The target is a public firm, a private firm, or an unlisted subsidiary of a public firm.
3. All public firms are listed on NYSE, Amex, or Nasdaq.
Bidding firms have available return data on the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) for at least five days around the merger announcement and
Compustat data for the year-end prior to the merger announcement.
5. The bidder acquired an interest of above 50% in the target firm, raising its interest from below 50% to above 50%.
6. The deal value is disclosed and above $1 million. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) , who document that the deregulation wave of the 1990s has spurred intense consolidation in the U.S. banking industry. In the new millennium, merger activity experienced a downward trend, and did not peak until the mid 2000s. The 2008 financial crisis led to a further dramatic decrease in the level of banking consolidation. However, in the most recent years, U.S. bank M&A activity exhibits an increasing trend, following the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act (Leledakis and Pyrgiotakis, 2016) .
Sample statistics
Insert Table 1 here Table 2 reports the distribution of our merger sample by target firm's industry affiliation, using 48-industry classifications from Fama and French (1997) . Industries definitions are based on the four-digit primary SIC codes. 3 We report by industry the number of banks making successful bids for all types of targets, and we further divide the sample based on the target firm's listing status. Interestingly, almost the whole sample (98.62%) involves targets within the financial industry, whereas the vast majority of deals (89.39%) are limited to bank-to-bank mergers.
Insert Table 2 here Lazard. Most of these investment banks appear in league tables of prior studies (Rau, 2000; Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003; Golubov et al., 2012 (Servaes and Zenner, 1996) .
Insert Table 4 here
Univariate Analysis
We use the standard event study methodology, outlined by Brown and Warner (1985) , to evaluate bidder gains around the merger announcement dates. We estimate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over a five-day event window, centered on the announcement date (-2, +2) using the market adjusted return model:
Where R i,t is the return for stock i on day t and R m,t is the market return on the CRSP NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq value-weighted index on day t. We do not estimate market model parameters over a time interval prior to the merger announcement to account for the possibility that a bidding bank had announced onether merger at some point during the estimation period (Fuller et al., 2002) . 5 We evaluate the statistical significance of our results based on the standardized cross-section test of Boehmer et al. (1991) . This procedure corrects for potential increases in the variance of abnormal returns, commonly found in event studies. Further, to account for the non-normal distribution of the security returns, we test the statistical significance of the median values by using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Table 4 presents the mean CARs for bidding banks classified by the target firm's listing status and method of payment. The first column of Table 4 reports CARs for the full sample of bidders. Consistent with prior empirical findings, bidding banks realize negative abnormal returns upon the announcement of a merger. However, when we 4 We also examined other event windows frequently used in the literature (-1, +1), (-5, +1), (-10, +1), (-10, +10), (-1, +10), (-30,+5) . Results remained qualitatively similar. 5 To ensure robustness of our results we have also estimated CARs using the market model and the mean adjusted returns model. Results remained unchanged.
differentiate returns based on the method of payment we observe that cash offers experience insignificant results, whereas mergers financed with any type of stock realize statistically negative abnormal returns. Segmenting by the type of the target firm, we are able to extract more conclusive results. In public bids, the average abnormal return for bidding firms is -1.45%, and statistical significant at 1% level (Cornett and De, 1991; Houston and Ryngaert, 1997; DeLong and DeYoung, 2007) .
Again, returns for the cash offers are indistinguishable for zero. However, in stock or combination offers, abnormal returns are negative and significant in the scale of -1.61%
and -1.63%, respectively. The median abnormal returns for these deals are -1.37% and -1.64%, respectively, and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test is significant in both cases.
Therefore, in public bank M&As, equity offers translate to a negative market reaction (Travlos, 1987) . On the contrary, in private bids, the average bidding bank earns a 0.58% abnormal return, which is statistical significant at 1% level. These results suggest that bidders of privately held targets experience approximately 2.03% larger abnormal returns compared to bidders of publicly traded targets, on average. This difference is statistical significant at 1% level (t=9.84). Interestingly, in private offers, bidder abnormal returns are positive and significant regardless of the method of payment: cash (0.61%), stock (0.56%), and combination (0.57%). Medians are significant in all cases except from equity offers. In the case of subsidiary targets, the bidders CARs are insignificant for all groups. However, the difference in market reaction between public and subsidiary offers is also significant at 1% (t=4.17). Overall, our results support the existence of a "listing effect" in M&As between U.S. banks and domestic unlisted targets. Henceforth, in our discussion of results, we focus on mean CARs, since mean and median CARs tell the same story.
Insert Table 5 here
Explanations of the listing effect in bidder CARs
The majority of the U.S. studies that examine the listing effect in M&As attribute the difference in market reaction between public and private bids to method of payment effects. The monitoring hypothesis outlined by Chang (1998) Hence, we posit that the traditional explanations for the listing effect do not account for the difference in market reaction between listed and unlisted targets, for bank acquirers.
For example, the monitoring hypothesis, one of the most common explanations for the listing effect is non-financial U.S. mergers, assumes that private firms are familyowned or closely-held. However, in our sample, Thomson ONE reports only 3 cases where private target firms were family-owned. 6 It is therefore unlikely that the ownership structure of the target firm would have a monitoring effect in the case of M&As by U.S. banks.
One alternative explanation for the listing effect assumes limited competition for the privately-held targets, due to the higher costs of obtaining accurate information. In a limited competition environment, bidders may realize positive abnormal returns, since the likelihood of underpayment is higher (Chang, 1998) . In addition, James and Wier (1987) , Cornett and De (1991) , and others, document that the number of bids per target firm (proxy for competition) relates to statistically lower announcement returns, since the winning firm might overpay to win the bidding war. However, as shown in Table   3 , the vast majority of target firms receive only one public bid: public targets (98.10%), private targets (99.92%), subsidiary targets (100%). Hence, bidding banks face almost no competition in acquiring either listed or unlisted targets. It is therefore unlikely that the limited competition hypothesis can explain the listing effect in M&As by U.S.
banking firms.
Another strand of the M&As literature suggests that merger gains may be capitalized before the official merger announcement. For example, Schipper and Thomson (1983) find significant bidder gains in the pre-acquisition period, and attribute their findings to potential leakage of information. In this case, measuring abnormal returns at the announcement date may underestimate the market reaction for the transaction, since such leakage would show-up in the pre-announcement bidder returns. Hypothetically, this is a more likely scenario in deals than involve two listed firms, where information regarding the merging firms is more widely available, than in acquisitions of unlisted firms. Hence, the difference in announcement abnormal returns between listed and unlisted bids may not reflect a difference in wealth creation, since merger gains for public offers might have been ex-ante capitalized and impounded in the stock price. To account for this possibility, we examine if there is a run-up in the bidding firm's stock price, emanating from any potential leakage of information regarding the acquisition.
Following Faccio et al. (2006) we compute pre-announcement abnormal returns over the window (-15, -3) . Over this interval, abnormal returns are positive for all types of mergers, but significant only for the private offers. More precisely, bidder CARs are:
0.10% for public targets, 0.46% for private targets, and 0.63% for subsidiary targets.
Therefore, these results are inconsistent with the assumption that prior capitalization of merger gains accounts for the listing effect in our sample. 
Regulatory effects on bidder CARs
The U.S. banking industry is accustomed to legislative tsunamis. Federal legislations usually incorporate several regulations governing bank merger activity. Prior studies have outlined the important effect of regulatory changes on merger wealth gains (Carow and Heron, 1998; Becher, 2000 Becher, , 2009 Filson and Olfatti. 2014; Leledakis and Pyrgiotakis, 2016) . Therefore, we test whether these legislative changes could explain the difference in market reaction between public and nonpublic bids. These results indicate that legislative changes could have a significant impact on bidder abnormal returns. However, we are mostly interested in examining whether the difference in market reaction between public and nonpublic bids persists across regulatory periods. The last two columns of Table 5 report the differences between the means and medians for private and public targets, and subsidiary and public targets, respectively. 9 Our results indicate that bidder abnormal returns are larger for private and subsidiary targets than for public targets for all regulatory periods, and the magnitude of these differences does not vary substantially overtime. In terms of statistical significance, differences between means and medians for private and public targets are significant at 1% level in all regulatory periods. For subsidiary targets, differences are abnormal returns significant in all but the DFA period. Thus, the interpretation of these results is that the listing effect persists through time and is not due to any legislative changes in the U.S. banking industry.
Insert Table 6 here
CARs at the completion date
All the prior empirical work we have documented so far focuses on announcement period returns, implying that all expected price reactions should occur at the announcement of a bid. However, in practice, not all announced mergers are finally
completed. An important feature of the financial sector is that regulatory approval is mandatory for the completion of a transaction. Regulators may reject an application if the acquisition does not satisfy the public benefit criteria, or exceed several concentration limits (Desai and Stover, 1983) .
It is therefore likely that the probability of success may influence the market reaction upon the announcement of a proposed merger. In fact, the uncertain outcome may induce investors to postpone their reaction at a time where the bidder intention to acquire is indeed materialized. We explore whether the likelihood of an acquisition success is higher for unlisted targets than for listed targets. In this case, the announcement abnormal returns for the public bids could be downward biased compared to the returns for private bids. However, abnormal returns at the deal completion date may be higher for public than for private bids. As a result, the listing effect in announcement period gains may be explained by a difference in the proportion of successful acquisitions between the separate types of targets.
We base the assumption of a different probability in acquisition success for listed and unlisted target on two main arguments. Firstly, the Williams Act of 1968 mandates information disclose and waiting periods for acquisitions of publicly-traded firms, whereas such requirements are not applicable to acquisitions of privately-held firms.
Hence, acquisitions of private targets may be announced when completed (Officer et al., 2009 targets, 96 private targets, 7 subsidiary targets). Accordingly, the probability of success for a public bid is (789/(789+103))= 88.45%, the probability of success for a private bid is (1,155/(1,155+96))= 92.33%, and the probability of success for a subsidiary bid is (155/(155+7))= 95.68%. Consistent with our prediction, the probability of a successful acquisition in the case of a listed target is smaller relative to an unlisted target, albeit the differences are small.
At last, we examine whether these differences in acquisition success probabilities translate into differences in bidder abnormal returns at deal completion dates. In line with announcement period returns, we estimate bidder CARs over a five-day window, centered on the completion date. We include in the analysis only the bidders of the 2,099 M&As in which there was uncertainty about the success of the acquisition. 10 In fact, CARs are positive for all types of mergers, but significant only for public offers.
More specifically, bidder completion CARs are: 0.32% for public targets, 0.10% for private targets, and 0.47% for subsidiary targets. These results indicate that market participants do indeed reward bidding banks when they complete an acquisition of a public firm. However, differences between public and private offers, and public and subsidiary offers are insignificant, suggesting that the market reaction at the deal 10 Results were qualitatively similar for the whole sample of 2,178 M&As completion date does not offset the difference in market reaction between listed and unlisted targets at the announcement of such bids.
The role of financial advisors
Panel A of Table 7 presents the bidder CARs for the sample of the 1,055 M&As, segmenting by the target firm's listing status. Apparently, the results are consistent with the listing effect analyzed previously in this section, since bidder CARs in acquisitions of unlisted targets are significantly larger than in acquisition of listed targets. 11 In Panel B we partition the sample based on whether or not the bidding banks had used a financial advisor. For the whole sample of 1,055 mergers we find that the use of an advisor does not affect announcement abnormal returns, since returns in both cases are negative and significant but their difference is not statistical significant (Servaes and Zenner, 1996) . However, by segmenting again based on the target firm's listing status we are able to extract more conclusive results. In particular, in-house deals for public offers produce insignificant abnormal returns, whereas when an advisor is used, public bids experience a mean abnormal return in the scale of -1.90%, which is statistical significant at 1% level. On the contrary, in acquisitions of privately-held targets, we observe a different pattern: for in-house deals, average abnormal returns are -0.59% and marginally significant, whereas when an advisor is used, bidder CARs are 1.47%, and statistical significant at 1% level. Results for subsidiary targets are inconclusive.
Therefore, we observe an adverse effect of financial advisors on bidding banks' cumulative abnormal returns for public and private offers. Our findings suggest that financial advisory is more meaningful to the acquisitions of privately-held targets, since private financial firms should be more opaque than their publicly-traded rivals. Lastly, Panel C of Table 7 details CARs based on the financial advisors' reputation. Similar to McLaughlin (1992) , Rau 2000 , Ismail (2010 ), and Graham et al., (2015 , announcement abnormal returns to bidders advised by top-tier advisors are lower than those earned non-top-tier advised bidders.
Insert Table 7 here Overall, we conjecture that the use of financial advisors could at least partly explain the listing effect in acquisitions by U.S. banks. In fact, when bidding banks employ financial advisors, they experience approximately 3.37% higher abnormal returns on average when the target is privately-held than when the target is publicly-traded. The difference is statistical significant at 1% level (t=7.90).
Multivariate analysis
In the previous section, we analyze the bidding banks' abnormal returns using univariate analysis. Hence, to investigate whether multicollinearity is present in our models, we calculate the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for each independent variable in each regression.
In general, VIF values greater than 10 may merit further investigation. In our case, mean VIFs range from 1.89 to 3.94, suggesting that multicollinearity should not be a problem in our regression analysis. Table 8 presents the results of our multivariate regressions for all, public, private, and subsidiary acquisitions, respectively. The first three columns illustrate results for the whole sample, irrespective of the target firm's listing status. In all three models, the coefficients of Private and Subsidiary are positive and statistical significant. The magnitude of their coefficients suggests that: (1) the average acquisition of a privatelyheld firm earns a 1.5% in model 1 and a 2% in models 2 and 3 larger abnormal return than the average acquisition of a public firm, and (2) the average acquisition of a subsidiary earns a 1.2% in models 1 and 2 and a 1.3% in model 3 larger abnormal return than the average acquisition of a public firm. These results are in line with prior studies Models 4 to 6 report regression results for the subset of publicly-traded targets.
Regression analysis results
Consistent with the results for the whole sample, combination offers relate to a negative market reaction in acquisitions of public targets. In addition, RelSize is negative and significant in model 4, suggesting that bidder's returns decrease with the relative size of the target in public acquisitions (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Travlos, 1987) . Volatility is positive and significant in model 4, albeit loses significance with the addition of the financial advisor data. On the other hand, Pooling has a negative and statistical significant coefficient in all models, implying that the purchase method is superior to the pooling accounting method in terms of bidder CARs, for public bids. Furthermore, the variable Advisors is negative, and statistical significant in both models 5 and 6. (Servaes and Zenner, 1996) .
Overall, the explanatory power of all our models is relatively low, since the Adjusted R 2 ranges from 0% to 9.8%. Nonetheless, this finding is typically observed in regressions of bidder CARs (Fuller et al. 2002; DeLong 2003; Moeller et al., 2004) .
Insert Table 8 here
Bidder fixed effects
It is possible that the difference in market reaction between listed and unlisted bids does not relate to the target firm's listing status. It is also possible that there could be a firmspecific driver of acquisition success that can explain the variation in bidder abnormal 14 We also used the natural logarithm of the bidding firm's market value of equity 5 days before the merger announcement, as an alternative specification for Bidder Size. Results remained unchanged.
returns. In other words, firms that were good past acquirers are likely to engage in value-enhancing acquisitions in the future, and vice versa. In this case, the persistency of the acquirer returns may account for the positive market reaction in specific merger announcements. It is also likely, that the listing effect is due to the differences in the characteristics between bidders of public and private targets, and does not relate to the type of the target.
To control for these possibilities, Fuller et al. (2002) (2015), the inclusion of the bidder fixed effects almost doubles the explanatory power of our regression models, since the Adjusted R 2 ranges from 17.2% to 17.4%.
However, what it is important to us is that the coefficients of Private and Private*Advisors are also positive and significant. The magnitude of their coefficients is comparable, albeit smaller, with the regression results reported in Table 8 . These findings suggest that when bidding banks buy privately-held targets, and particularly when they employ a financial advisor for the transaction, they experience larger abnormal returns relative to their peers, even after controlling for any time-invariant bidder characteristics.
Insert Table 9 here
Control for sample selection
Our analysis so far is based on the assumption that the choice of target firm is exogenously determined. However, it is likely that the acquirers of private targets in our sample were not selected randomly from the population of U.S. banking firms,
suggesting that the type of the target firm may be determined endogenously. In this case, the choice of a target firm may be correlated with certain bidder and/or dealspecific characteristics, and the OLS estimates become unreliable. To address this sample selection issue, we employ Heckman's (1979) two-stage procedure, using the inverse Mills ratio. Table 10 presents the results for this analysis. We conduct the Henchman's procedure three times, to obtain comparable results with the ones reported in Table 8 . According to our probit models, the choice of private target is negatively related to geographical focus, any form of stock financing, relative size of the deal, bidder size, and the use of an advisor on the part of the bidder. The Pseudo R 2 of these first-stage equations indicate that our probit models explain up to 29.7% of the choice between a public and a private target. More importantly, the results from the OLS regression in the secondstage equations are almost identical with the results in Table 10 . In private offers, bidder
CARs increase with the use of a financial advisor, after controlling for sample selection.
In fact, the Inverse Mills ratio is insignificant in all three cases, suggesting that the selection bias should not be a primary concern in our regression analysis.
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Conclusion
In this paper, we examine bidder abnormal returns in 2,178 successful M&As of publicly traded U.S. banking companies announced between 1984 and 2015, as well as the differences in stock market reaction for separate types of targets. Initially, our findings indicate the presence of a listing effect in acquisitions by U.S. banks:
Cumulative abnormal returns for unlisted bids (privately-held companies and subsidiaries), are significantly larger than for listed bids. In fact, these results are in line with prior literature in non-financial U.S M&As.
The intriguing part of this analysis however, is to find an explanation for this phenomenon. Much of the existing literature in the non-financial mergers attributes the different market reaction between listed and unlisted bids to method of payment effects.
In particular, these explanations predict larger bidder CARs in private offers, when the deal is financed with common stock. Equity offers could help resolving financial asymmetries in the target firm's valuation, or result in the creation of effective performance monitors in the bidding firm. Nonetheless, in our sample, we don't find any empirical support for method of payment effects in private offers. On the contrary, bidding banks gain in such transactions, even when they pay with cash, stock, or a combination of the two. Moreover, we find that our results are not due to potential leakages of information about public acquisitions or limited competition for private targets. We further account for the several legislative changes in the U.S. banking industry. Notably, the listing effect is pervasive across all regulatory reforms.
We examine the role of the financial advisors in the acquisitions by U.S. banks, and if the use of a financial advisor from the bidding banks has any predictive power in explaining announcement abnormal returns. Presumably, financial advisory services should be of major importance in reducing valuation uncertainties for acquirers of privately-held financial firms. Similarly, we predict positive abnormal returns for bidding banks that use financial advisors in private offers. Our results document that in-house acquisitions of private firms yield negative bidder returns in the scale of -0.59%, whereas when an advisor is used, bidder abnormal returns are 1.47%, and statistical significant at 1%. This substantial difference in market reaction suggests that the acquisition of privately-held financial firm results in a positive market reaction only when a financial advisor is used on the part of the bidding bank. Otherwise, the bidder abnormal returns for private bids are similar to the ones reported for public bids. Lastly, results for subsidiary targets are inconclusive, and financial advisor reputation has a negative effect in bidder CARs in all cases.
In cross-sectional regressions, where the five-day abnormal returns are the dependent variable, the listing effect is robust to the inclusion of several frequently-used independent variables such as bidder size, method of payment, geographical scope, and prior bidder performance. More precisely, our indicator variables that proxy for the listing status of the target firm and the use of bidder financial advisors in private offers are positive and statistical significant in all regressions. To account for the possibility that a bidder-specific factor may better explain the variation in bidder CARs, we included bidder fixed effects in our regressions. Despite the presence of a strong bidder fixed effect in our sample, banks that acquire privately-held financial firms and use The natural logarithm of the bidding firm's total assets at year-end prior to the merger announcement. Volatility
The standard deviation of the market-adjusted residuals from 210 to 20 days prior to the merger announcement. Table 5 Bidder cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date 
